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ABSTRACT 
A rampant supposition exists that the judicial nominations of females are less 
successful due to the nominee’s gender (Martinek 2002). It is thus paramount to further 
investigate empirically whether individual nominee characteristics, such as gender, 
inhibit the nominee’s possibility of obtaining Senate confirmation. I empirically explore 
this conjecture in two distinct ways. First, I employ a difference in means test to 
determine whether women are confirmed to the District Court at a lower rate, on average, 
than are men. Subsequently, I test the hypothesis using a logistic regression that examines 
the influence of gender and the interaction of gender and race on the likelihood of 
confirmation, while controlling for other factors. Aiming to contribute to previous 
scholarship by providing an updated empirical analysis, I offer an update to Wendy 
Martinek’s original analysis of judicial confirmations by using the Lower Federal Court 
Confirmation Database to examine whether the influences of gender, race and their 
interaction on confirmation dynamics vary by partisan control. Having found the effect 
that nonwhite women are less likely to be confirmed by a GOP Senate than white males, I 
	  	   vi 
examine whether gender and race are the key factors or whether the relationship may 
instead be driven by ideology. Despite popular belief, the analysis of the data is not 
supportive of an extensive gender gap and undermines the claim that gender alone is an 
imperative factor inhibiting women from obtaining a successful confirmation. However, 
the empirical results are supportive of the hypothesis that racial minority females are less 
likely to be confirmed by a GOP controlled Senate than their white female and male 
counterparts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Loretta Lynch’s recent confirmation process to become the second female 
Attorney General of the United States can be characterized as acrimonious, laborious, and 
historic. Having previously served as the United States Attorney for the Eastern District 
of New York, an appointment confirmed by the U.S. Senate, she appeared to be a 
foreseeable choice to replace acting Attorney General Eric Holder. However, Loretta 
Lynch’s Senate confirmation process was longer than that of any nominee in the past 
thirty years1. As pointed out by President Obama, Lynch’s nomination was stalled for 
161 days, “longer than the previous seven Attorney General nominees combined”2. 
Presently, Loretta Lynch serves as the first African American female U.S. 
Attorney General, a position greatly coveted by brilliant male and female litigators alike. 
During his two terms, President Obama has nominated more diverse nominees to federal 
courts than any of his predecessors, “but the nominees are not getting confirmed with the 
same kind of successes”3. Caroline Fredrickson, director of the American Constitution 
Society, says,4 “For women and minorities, it's just been a bigger hill to climb before they 
actually get a vote.” The fact that Loretta Lynch is not the first woman to serve as a 
federal judge or Attorney General is conducive to the idea that women are not overtly 
discriminated against and barred from claiming prestigious positions requiring Senate 
confirmation simply because they are women. However, with court diversification being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 President Barack Obama nominated Loretta Lynch on November 8th, 2014. She was 
confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 26, 2015 but not confirmed by 
2 Louis Jacobson, "Is Loretta Lynch Nomination Delayed Longer than 7 Other Attorneys 
General Combined?", Politifact, 2015.  
3 Carrie Johnson, "Obama Gets High Marks for Diversifying the Bench." NPR, 2011. 
4 Johnson, "Obama Gets High Marks for Diversifying the Bench”.	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regarded as a high priority issue during the current Obama administration, it is paramount 
to further investigate whether individual nominee characteristics, such as gender, race, 
and the interaction of these two factors, inhibit the success of the nominee’s Senate 
confirmation. Despite not being a nominee to a lower federal bench judgeship, Loretta 
Lynch is the perfect example of a superbly qualified nominee facing animosity from the 
Senate to the point it could have cost her the nomination. Whether because she was a 
female or because she was a racial minority female, Loretta Lynch’s struggle to secure a 
well-deserved confirmation by the Senate is something no woman should have to 
experience because of her gender and race, factors that have nothing to do with her 
qualifications for office.  
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the arduous process that is Senatorial 
confirmation for judicial appointments and the factors driving variation in success of the 
confirmation. Specifically, it aims to contribute to previous scholarship by providing an 
updated empirical analysis of the relationship between a nominee’s gender and 
confirmation success as the outcome. Building on previous literature and empirical 
research, the primary objective is to identify the nuances of “[one of the] controversies 
that has dominated public discourse with regard to Congress and its confirmation 
responsibilities: the perception of differential treatment of female and minority 
nominees.”5 This research will empirically explore how factors such as race, ideology, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Wendy L. Martinek, Mark Kemper, and Steven Van Winkle. "To Advise and Consent: 
The Senate and Lowe Federal Court Nominations.", The Journal of Politics 64.2 (2002): 
337-61.  
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and judicial qualifications are related to gender and whether they drive and explain 
unsuccessful Senate confirmations for female nominees. 
 
AN ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP: THE PRESIDENT AND THE SENATE  
The strife between the President and Congress to impact future judicial outcomes 
via judicial nominees and the relative power each actor holds throughout the process are 
complexities worth discussing. The Constitution of the United States, specifically Article 
II Section 26, is particularly elusive about the President’s appointment power of judicial 
nominees, the magnitude of the Senate’s role in nominee confirmation and the required 
qualifications for the judicial nominees themselves. While the President has the power to 
draft his short list of desired nominees for particular courts, the Senate’s role in the 
confirmation process is textually described as solely encompassing their contribution of 
“advice and consent” with no specific delineation of what such a responsibility entail. 
Surely, each actor’s role in the nomination and confirmation stages of the judicial 
appointment process is only vaguely addressed in the Constitution, with much room for 
interpretation and manipulation. 
As a result of the Senate’s authority to participate in the confirmation process 
originating in the most legitimate text of the Nation, the role of the Senate in 
confirmations has in actuality been determined by the actions of Senators themselves 
(Lambert 2012; Goldman 2003; Binder Maltzman 2002). Early on, Congress asserted its 
right to independently evaluate judicial nominees’ qualifications and has since continued 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  "Constitution of the United States – Official, " National Archives and Records 
Administration. 
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to do so following its own criteria. The Legislative branch has been able to substantially 
partake in the assessment of competency and ideological stance of candidates as much as, 
if not more than, the Executive branch.7 Because “the Senate's early practices evince a 
historical tradition of it as an active and political participant in confirmations” 8 , 
Presidents must be able to anticipate which nominees will incur heightened political costs 
during the Senate confirmation process and adjust their choices accordingly (Chang 
2001; Nixon 2004). Whereas presidents can put in place like-minded individuals eager to 
move policy implementation in their preferred directions through the power of 
appointments (Moe 1985; Cameron, Cover and Segal 1998; Krehbiel 1998), Senators in 
the Judiciary Committee who oppose the president attempt to play defense to the best of 
their ability.  
Senators during the confirmation process are generally discussed as a 
homogenous group. However, not only do Senators seek to confirm nominees who share 
their views of the law vis-à-vis politics, but they are not reticent when it comes to 
delaying the confirmation process of candidates that do not match their ideological 
background (Cameron, Cover and 1998; Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998; O’Scannlain 
2003; Asmussen 2011).  
Sheldon Goldman introduces an “index of obstruction and delay”9 and suggests 
both parties, relying on an ideological justification, are responsible for the obstruction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Jeff Yates and William Gillespie, “Supreme Court Power Play: Assessing the 
Appropriate Role of the Senate in the Confirmation Process.”, Wash. & Lee L. Review 
Vol. 58 (2001), 1053-1070 
8  Yates and Gillespie, “Supreme Court Power Play.  
9 Sheldon Goldman, “Assessing the Senate judicial conformation process: The Index of 
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and delay during their periods of control in the Senate. The problem of such high levels 
of obstruction and delay in turn are to be understood as procedural given that Senators 
from the Republican Party and Democratic Party alike have engaged and continue to 
engage in manipulating the duration of nominee confirmations. In this spatial world 
fueled by ideological conflict, Congress tries to prevent the President from stacking the 
court with justices who will move policy too far from its preferences. If this school of 
thought is correct and both parties are responsible for obstruction to defend their 
ideology, then it shouldn’t matter whether the Democrats or the Republicans control the 
Senate. If ideological conflict, alone, drives variation in confirmation duration and 
success, then we would not expect to observe any differences based on race or gender 
after controlling for ideological differences.   
Due to the fact that Senators legitimately can and do intervene in the confirmation 
process of judicial nominees as vastly or as frivolously as they themselves deem (Yates 
and Gillespie 2001; Weingast and Moran 1983; O’Scannlain 2003; Goldman 2003; 
Binder Maltzman 2002), it is important to differentiate between the implications of an 
assertive Senate and those of a deferential one. Under the deferential view, Senators do 
not give weight to the ideological foundation of the nominees so long as they “fall within 
a broad mainstream”10. In essence, deferential Senators are expected to confirm nominees 
that display exceptional qualifications and sound character and only vote against a 
nominee if an extraordinary circumstance presents itself. This deferential view of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Obstruction and Delay,” Judicature Vol. 86, No. 5 (March-April 2003), 251-257.  
10 Grayson Lambert, “The Real Debate over the Senate’s Role in the confirmation  
Process.” Duke Law Journal Vol. 61 (2012), 1283-1327.  
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Senators supports the theory that duration of Senate confirmations varies depending on 
individual nominee characteristics and institutional factors because, the deference of 
some Senators allows other assertive Senators to accumulate the majority needed for the 
confirmation of a nominee (Asmussen 2011; Lambert 2012).  
Following the assertive view, Senators are primarily concerned with the 
ideological preferences of the nominee in question. The Senators’ interpretation of the 
nominee’s ideological views is a product of their justification about the relationship 
between politics and the law11. Confirmation delays for judicial nominees are more 
probable when assertive Senators disagree with the confirmation of a nominee whose 
probability to rely on their ideological foundations more than the law appears to be 
heightened. As was the case with Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork, if nominees 
appear to be too ideological, then assertive Senators who believe politics are a foundation 
for interpretation of the law will attempt to delay and completely block the nomination12. 
SEXISM IN THE JUDICIARY 
“Legitimizing inherent ‘differences’ as ‘normal’ reduces the very real oppressive 
power of sexism into some kind of gender misunderstanding” 
- Carol Gilligan 
 Knowingly or unknowingly in many contexts, women as a collective group have 
historically experienced sexism13. In the context of appointment confirmations, sexism is 
and has been a significant constraint for women (Nixon and Goss 2001; Hartley 2001; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Lambert, “The Real Debate over the Senate’s Role in the confirmation Process.”, 1283-
1327.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Sexism defined as “prejudice or discrimination based on sex and behavior, conditions, 
or attitudes that foster stereotypes of social roles based on sex” (Merriam-Webster 2015).  
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Bell 2002; O’ Connor Ives 2006) particularly because “it is an intrinsic part of the 
judiciary system and masculine hegemony is self-perpetuating in the confirmation 
process” 14 . Kathleen O’Connor Ives delineates exactly how the existing Senate 
confirmation process disadvantages female nominees: 
“While the [confirmation] process on its face does not preclude a spectrum 
of nominees in terms of gender, it is vulnerable to basic institutional bias 
considering that the most influential players are overwhelmingly male. It 
can be inferred that although women are being treated equally during the 
nomination hearings, they are being treated differently long before the 
hearings take place. Therefore, gender imbalance is not a question of 
discrimination in the hearings, but of women’s omission from the socio-
political network that leads to the hearings. As a result, formal equality 
will not remedy the problem, because formal equality is based on the 
premise that women must act like men.”15 
 
Despite being a compelling solution, simply confirming more women to the Judiciary 
once they have been nominated does not remedy the disadvantage women face when 
wanting to be nominated in the first place (O’Connor Ives 2006; Brittain 2009; Torres-
Spelliscy 2009; Tobias 2010). Women miss out on “a very important conduit to 
appointments and judicial nominations: personal connections to political power16”, and 
once they do obtain nominations they face the additional burden of distinguishing 
themselves from ineffectual women17. Of course it is pivotal that women are more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Kathleen O’Connor, “Out of the Loop: Female Federal District Court Candidates 
Disadvantaged by a Nomination Process Imbued with Favoritism”, 2006. 
15 In “Out of the Loop: Female Federal District Court Candidates Disadvantaged by a 
Nomination Process Imbued with Favoritism”, Kathleen O’Connor Ives tests whether 
women have dissimilar experiences from men while getting confirmed by the Senate. She 
compared hearing transcripts of twenty-five male and twenty-five female federal District 
Court nominees in search of differential treatment between men and women nominees.  
16 O’Connor, “Out of the Loop”.  
17 Catherine Herr Van Nostrand, Catherine Herr. Gender-Responsible Leadership: 
Detecting Bias, Implementing Interventions (1993).  
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represented in the Judiciary, the Senate, and the Senate Judiciary Committee; yet, the 
disadvantages women face are also deeply rooted in society. Georgia Duerst-Lahti and 
Rita Mae Kelly (1995), in Gender Power, Leadership and Governance, effectively trace 
the way men and women’s relations are marked in society by the power attributed to their 
gender.  
“One important but largely invisible by-product of men’s domination of 
institutional power has been their ability to allocate society values and 
resources through a self-justifying ideology. Men’s position atop social 
institutions has enabled them to structure institutions, create laws, 
legitimize particular knowledge, establish moral codes, and shape culture 
in ways that perpetuate their power over women. Masculine assumptions 
underpin the norms that become normal in social relations, so when 
women enter and act within the realm of leadership and governance, they 
do so within ideological terms of masculine norms.” 
 
The discussion of the aforementioned literature on the Senate confirmation 
process, sexism in the Judiciary and women’s disadvantages in the sphere of government 
and leadership has set the stage from which this paper aims to build upon. It has 
concisely outlined Senators’ motives for delaying a nominee’s confirmation process, the 
concealed sexism women experience outside the of the confirmation hearings themselves, 
and the power men derive from their gender in society. This literature suggests that 
failure and delays in confirmation of female nominees is not just due to ideological 
conflict and differences. Rather, gender will matter independent of ideology. The 
literature suggests that any observed bias against women in the judicial confirmation 
process would not simply be a function of ideological conflict and differences. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  
	  	  
9 
LITERATURE ON NOMINATIONS TO THE FEDERAL BENCH 
Prior work regarding the Senate confirmation process for judicial nominees has 
largely been a combination of non-empirical analyses of the evolving process with case 
studies (Chase 1972; McFeeley 1987; Allison 1996; Barrow, Zuk, and Gryski 1996;; 
Hartley and Holmes 1997), such as the nomination of Robert Bork or the Clinton 
nominations to the Supreme Court18, and empirical analyses of larger comprehensive 
samples. However, imperative deficiencies in previous studies that must be addressed are 
the dismissal of District Courts as inconsequential, the denigration of confirmation 
outcome as a main unit of empirical analysis, and the omission of the interaction between 
a nominee’s gender and race.  
Although it is natural for individuals to primarily focus on the outcome of high 
profile nominations to publicized vacancies, such as those of the Supreme Court, the 
outcome of nominations to District Courts more frequently affect the lives of American 
citizens.  
“The individuals charged with dispensing justice in our society have a 
direct impact on civil rights protections for all. As such, the federal 
judiciary must be perceived by the public as an instrument of justice, and 
the individuals who are selected for this branch of government must be the 
embodiment of fairness and impartiality.”19 
 
While the Supreme Court only accepts to hear about eighty cases annually, the District 
Courts throughout the country are tasked with deciding an increasing number of cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Cameron and Segal, “The Politics of Scandals: The Case of Supreme Court 
Nominations, 1877-1994.” (1998) 
19 “Why You Should Care About Judicial Nominations”, The Leadership Conference on 
Civil and human Rights, The Leadership Conference Education Fund, (2016).  
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averaging to about 375,87020 criminal and civil cases per year. Contrary to the prevailing 
sentiment that “differences in their respective dockets ensure that the circuit courts have a 
significantly greater potential impact on policy than do District Courts (Allison 1996)”, 
District Courts have a tremendous amount of power. Presiding over larger volume and 
frequency of new cases than appellate courts, District Courts deal with cases involving 
fundamental rights, civil liberties, and women’s rights and often do have the final say in 
significant matters21. Ensuring that courts at the district level are diversified and free of 
systematic barriers of entry for women trying to enter the lower federal bench is thus 
primordial.  
Finally, of exceptional relevance is the fact that “race and gender [have 
manifested] no effect on confirmation duration except in the case of nominations to 
District Courts”22 and 54.6% of active circuit court judges, a majority, “had prior judicial 
experience and were serving as a district judge immediately prior to their appointment.”23 
Accordingly, differences in the outcome of confirmation for nominees to District Court 
vacancies and the reality that nominees to the highest court arise in the form of 
promotions of active District Court judges led to this empirical analysis’ focus on District 
Court nominations. While prior research has indicated that gender and race have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 United States Courts, “Judicial Business: Caseload Highlights”, Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, (2015).  
21 “Why You Should Care About Judicial Nominations”, The Leadership Conference on 
Civil and human Rights, The Leadership Conference Education Fund, (2016). 
22 Wendy L. Martinek, Mark Kemper, and Steven Van Winkle. "To Advise and Consent: 
The Senate and Lowe Federal Court Nominations.", The Journal of Politics 64.2 (2002): 
337-61. 
23 Barry J. McMillion, “U.S. Circuit Court Judges: Profile of Professional Experiences 
Prior to Appointment”, Congressional Research Service, (2014)  
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influenced confirmation duration, the research focus must be broadened to include the 
examination of whether these factors affect ultimate confirmation success.  
A nominee’s failure to gain the position they were nominated for could be a 
product of a highly publicized scandal that pressured the nominee to drop out24, the 
crusade of interest groups against the appointment of the proposed nominee25 to the point 
of presidential withdrawal, or substantial delays caused by Senators during various stages 
of the confirmation process. Given the multitude of reasons that could cause a nominee’s 
confirmation to be delayed to the point of failure, it is critical to make the distinction 
between analyzing nomination failure-or-success and nomination duration. Some 
scholars have suggested that important contributions to the literature lie solely in the 
study of duration and not outcome given that the vast majority of nominations are 
ultimately successful because they end in a nomination (Allison 1996; Kurtz, Fleisher, 
and Bond 1998; Martinek 2002; Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 2009; Ostrander 2013).  
As indicated by the results in Table 1, about 80% of all lower federal court 
nominations end in successful confirmations. Nomination success of District Court 
nominees specifically is higher at 83.3%, while 67.6% of circuit court nominees are also 
confirmed. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. 
25 E.g. President Obama’s nominee, Debo P. Adegbile’s, failed to secure his appointment 
as head of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department due to his previous 
involvement as Litigation Director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. 
Under his leadership, the NAACP represented Mumia Abu-Jamal during his appeal to a 
death sentence for killing police officer David Faulkner. President Obama was unable to 
rally enough Senate Democrats to ensure the confirmation of Mr. Abegbile. 	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Table 1: Success of Nominations to Lower Federal Court, 1977 - 200426 
  
Successful 
Nominations 
 
Unsuccessful 
Nominations 
 
 
All 
Nominations 
 
District Courts  
 
1,111 (83.3%) 
 
222 (16.7%) 
 
1,333 
 
Circuit Courts  
 
282 (67.6%) 
 
135 (32.4%) 
 
417 
 
District and 
Circuit Courts 
 
1,393 (79.6%) 
 
357 (20.4%) 
 
1,750 
 
Of course, the total number of nominations to circuit courts is significantly lower than the 
total number of nominations to District Courts simply due to the fact that there are only 
13 circuit courts compared to 94 District Courts27. It is very apparent that the standard for 
both court levels is that the majority of nominees have been confirmed, leading scholars 
to presume that “because few of the nominations that make it to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearings fail, examination of factors that affect whether or not a nominee is 
confirmed would not be highly informative”. However, it is remiss to suggest that 
studying the effect of key factors on nomination failure-or-success would not be fruitful.  
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: DIFFERENCE IN MEANS 
It must be noted that one cannot suppose that prospective female and racial 
minority female nominees were and are as readily available for nomination as their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Wendy L. Martinek, The Lower Federal Court Confirmation Database. 1977-2004. 
Constitution Project's Courts Initiative. Binghamton University, 23 Mar. 2005. 
27 “Why You Should Care About Judicial Nominations”, The Leadership Conference on 
Civil and human Rights, The Leadership Conference Education Fund, (2016). 
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white-male counterparts. Such an assumption “is especially problematic for nomination 
opportunities occurring early in the period of observation (before women and minorities 
started obtaining law degrees in significant numbers) and for appellate seats belonging to 
states with very small minority populations”28. To understand the lack of diversity of the 
lower federal bench and the potential challenges unconventional nominees face, it is 
essential to ascertain whether a difference in obtaining a successful outcome exists 
between conventional and nonconventional nominees. “Unconventional nominee” refers 
to female and racial minority female nominees compared to the conventional nominee to 
lower federal court judgeships: white males.  
Existing literature has previously supported and contradicted the claim that the 
impact of gender on confirmation outcome is unfounded given the conflicting nature of 
empirical results29. In order to preliminarily demonstrate the existence of a link between 
the aforementioned factors of gender, race, and outcome, difference of means tests were 
conducted.  
Table 2: Difference in Confirmation Rates to District Courts By Gender 
Gender of Nominee % Confirmed 
Men 83.3% (1090) 
Women 83.5% (243) 
Note: The number of observations in each cell is presented in parentheses. The difference 
in means across men and women is not statistically significant. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Nicole Asmussen, “Female and Minority Judicial Nominees: President’s Delight and 
Senators’ Dismay?” (2011).  
29 Ibid.  
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An inspection of Table 2, which depicts the difference in confirmation rates to 
District Courts by gender, does not on its face provide evidence for the contention of 
differential treatment based on gender. More than 80% of male and female nominees are 
confirmed to District Courts and, according to the data, women are confirmed 0.2% more 
than men. Although the difference in means across men and women is not statistically 
significant, it is again important to highlight that women have faced additional barriers of 
entry30 and only 18.2% of nominees have been women. Based on this assessment of 
whether variation in gender is causing the variation observed in confirmation outcome, it 
would be straightforward to assume that “senators are rather disinclined to oppose female 
nominations because they face political costs for doing so”31 and therefore do not prevent 
female nominees from getting confirmed because of their gender. Of further interest, 
however, is the reality that a nominee’s race among many other variables could 
potentially drive a difference in the confirmation outcomes of nominees. The interaction 
of gender and race is not an uncommon phenomenon existing in reality. Yet, it is an 
interaction that has been frequently ignored.  
Table 3 depicts the difference in confirmation rates to District Courts by gender 
and race to illustrate the change in percentage of confirmed nominees considering the 
interactions of these two factors. Examining the relationship between gender, race, and 
confirmation outcome, lends credibility to the assertion that differential treatment by the 
Senate exists based on the interaction of these two independent variables.  As we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Kathleen O’Connor, “Out of the Loop: Female Federal District Court Candidates 
Disadvantaged by a Nomination Process Imbued with Favoritism”, 2006. 
31 Nicole Asmussen, “Female and Minority Judicial Nominees: President’s Delight and 
Senators’ Dismay?” (2011). 
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consider the number of observations for each category of nominee (white men, nonwhite 
men, white women and nonwhite women), we notice a stark decline and can empirically 
see the lack of diversity during the period observed. Furthermore, it is evident that while 
the confirmation percentage of white men, nonwhite men, and white women gravitates 
around 83% - 86%, the percentage of nonwhite women nominees confirmed to the 
District Court is about 77.4%. This percentage is significantly lower than the 
confirmation rate observed for both white women and nonwhite men.  
Table 3: Difference in Confirmation Rates to District Courts by Gender and Race 
Gender & Race of 
Nominee % Confirmed 
White Men 83.4% (915) 
Nonwhite Men 83.8% (173) 
White Women 85.3% (190) 
Nonwhite Women 77.4% (53) 
Note: The number of observations in each cell is presented in parentheses.  The 
percentage of nonwhite women nominees confirmed to the District Court is significantly 
lower than the confirmation rate observed for both white women and nonwhite men, p < 
.10, one-tailed test.  
 
A nominee’s individual failure or success can shed a lot of insight into their 
particular interaction with the Senate and their journey to the lower federal bench. While 
it may appear that looking at nominees’ failure and success rates would not speak to the 
purported systematic rejection of nominees based on certain traits, such as gender, it does 
in fact provide insight into the Senate’s reception of females and racial minority female 
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nominees. The difference in means tests presented in Table 2 and Table 3 offer insights 
regarding the confirmation outcomes of nominees depending on their gender and the 
combination of gender and race. More in-depth analysis of the success of these types of 
nominees compared to their white male counterparts would be indicative of the endgame 
behavior of Senators after employing their disruptive confirmation tactics. Although 
failure of confirmation may occur quickly or slowly thus spurring other scholars to use of 
confirmation delay as their primary unit of analysis, confirmation outcome is a more 
telling and compelling unit of analysis. Confirmation duration is a measure of the 
Senate’s willingness to accept or reject oncoming attempts at court diversification; 
confirmation outcome, on the other hand, reflects definitive Senate action. As much as 
Senators may want to derail the nominations of female and racial minority female 
nominees, delay does not disqualify these women from ultimately claiming they 
succeeded in obtaining confirmation. Delay is undesirable, but it is not as permanent of a 
burden as is the exclusion of women from the judiciary via failed confirmations.  
Contemporary literature has empirically examined the effect of multiple variables 
on confirmation outcome, but it has failed to definitively tease out the relationship 
between a nominees’ gender, race and confirmation process. Nevertheless, several 
variables recurrently emanated as noteworthy factors responsible for altering the 
confirmation outcome of judicial nominees.  
“At times, divided government can doom a nominee (Bell 2002; Binder and 
Maltzman 2002) while at other times divided government is not a hindrance 
(Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998). Overall, in the past circuit court nominees take 
longer to be confirmed while District Court nominees are confirmed more quickly 
(Hartley and Holmes 1997), but that could change given more recent research 
results (McMillion 2013). To be certain, we have learned that depending on the 
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period studied, nominee characteristics, political factors, or institutional 
constraints results showcase a particular set of variables as being more significant 
than others.”32  
 
Ultimately, the selection of variables as measures with empirical validity that have been 
previously posited by scholars to affect the outcome of Senate confirmations 
consequently led to the construction of a series of empirical hypotheses.  
EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES 
“The President has appeared to stress diversity because it yields multiple 
benefits. For instance, numerous people of color and women help other judges 
understand and decide complex issues respecting questions, namely abortion and 
discrimination, and hold different valuable perspectives in discrete fields.”  
- Carl Tobias 
 
Historically, the Senate itself has predominantly been composed of non-minority 
male members and women have predominately been the minority gender in all sects of 
the federal government, raising concerns about descriptive versus substantive 
representation (Mansbridge 1999; Bratton and Haynie 1999). The lack of diversity in the 
Senate has previously been accepted as a partial explanation of the lack of women and 
racial diversity of nominees being confirmed to seats in the federal courts33. This suggests 
the first hypothesis:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Salmon Shomade, Roger Hartley, and Lisa Holmes, “Lower Federal Court Judicial 
Confirmation Fights: A Critical Review of the Empirical Literature and Future Research 
Directions” (2014). 
33 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, “A Bench that Looks Like America.” Judges’ Journal Vol. 48 
No. 3 (2009), 12-17.  	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H1: Female nominees will fail to get confirmed to district judgeships more 
than male nominees 
A president’s fear of Senate hostility, not having a nominee confirmed in a timely 
manner and having to select ideologically moderate female and minority nominees have 
also served as explanations for the slow diversification of the courts (Martinek 2002; 
Kemper and Van Winkle 2002). Studying the effect of gender in the context of District 
Court judicial appointments will provide contemporary insight as to whether or not the 
gender of a nominee could be a hindering factor in the success of their confirmation. 
Women have failed to be confirmed to judgeships when compared to their male 
counterparts, specifically during moments of divided government (Bell 2002a) and at 
courts in all levels of the lower federal bench (Nixon and Goss 2001). Other factors, not 
gender, may in turn account for any disparities.  
The significance of nominee characteristics, including gender and race, has been 
evaluated time and time again revealing results in which gender is cause for confirmation 
failure but race is not (Hartley 2001) and vice versa (Martinek 2002). The conflicting 
literature and the lack of exploration regarding the intersectionality of race and gender of 
an individual nominee in the context of Senate confirmation led to the formulation of the 
following hypothesis:  
H2: Female nominees who belong to a minority race (Including: African 
American, Asian American, Native American and Hispanic) will experience 
more failure than female nominees who belong to the Caucasian race and 
male nominees.  
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“The increased presence of women on the bench improves the quality of justice: women 
judges can bring an understanding of the impact of the law on the lives of women and 
girls to the bench, and enrich courts’ understanding of how best to realize the intended 
purpose and effect of the law that the courts are charged with applying (NWLC 2016)”. 
Nevertheless, if female nominees and racial minority nominees overall are perceived as 
experiencing a more arduous confirmation process frequently resulting in failure 
(Martinek 2002; Solowiej et al 2005), it is reasonable to postulate that racial minority 
female nominees will experience delay and failure more than female nominees who are 
Caucasian.  
Gender and race are factors that have been attested as being important and in need 
of examination, yet their impact has not been fully explored empirically. Evidence 
suggests that female and racial minority candidates are confirmed less frequently and 
only after what can be characterized as unusually long vacancies. There is an empirical 
indication that women and racial minority nominees are not successful for reasons not 
rooted in poorer ABA ratings or other individual qualifications. “When women are fairly 
represented [at the] federal court level, those courts are more reflective of the diverse 
population of the nation and women, and men, may have more confidence that the court 
understands the real-world implications of its rulings (NWLC 2016)”. Women and 
minorities are successful in obtaining confirmation less than half as frequently as male 
and non-minority nominees, emphasizing that gender and minority effects are significant 
and need to be further explored (Martinek 2002; Nixon and Goss 2001) in order to boost 
court diversification.  
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When controlling for divided government, partisanship, gridlock and ideology of 
actors, the significance of qualifications and individual characteristics, such as ABA 
ratings and gender, are inconsistent and conflicting (Bond and Fleisher 2000; Fleisher 
and Bond 2001; Binder and Maltzman 2002; Asmussen 2011). Considering female 
nominees during periods in which the Senate is controlled by Democrats versus when it is 
controlled by Republicans, I hypothesize the confirmation process will result in more 
failure during the latter scenario. 
H3: Female nominees and racial minority female nominees will experience 
more failure under a Republican (GOP) controlled Senate than when the 
Democratic Party controls the Senate  
Racial and gender biases are simply stronger among Republicans than among Democrats, 
in part because these subgroups have tended to have more liberal leaning preferences 
(Weisburg 1987; Bibby 2000).  
“One important cleavage is the differential advantage in minority – and to 
a lesser extent, women’s – support enjoyed by the Democratic Party 
(Bibby 2000; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Chaney et al. 1998; Mueller 
1988). Past scholarship suggests that this cleavage translates into greater 
support on the part of Democratic legislators for issue positions favored by 
minorities and women (Black 1979; Robinson 1982). (Solowiej et al 
2005)”  
 
In general, women have tended to be more liberal than men regarding a variety of issues 
such as gun control, foreign policy, legalization of marijuana, and capital punishment 
(Cook 1979; Diamond 1977; Erickson and Luttbeg 1973; Lee 1976; Baxter and Lansing 
1980). This makes women, and women of color in particular, less likely to be confirmed 
under a GOP Senate. “Due to the fact that women do consistently vote in a more liberal 
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direction than men (Welch 1985; Thomas Welch 2001; Bibby 2000)” and “female 
legislators have more liberal voting records, distinct policy preferences and voice 
concerns different from those voiced by their male counterparts (Firestone Vega 1995)”, 
it is expected that female nominees will experience failure when ideologically distant 
from Republican Senators controlling the Senate.  
Alternatively, any observed negative relationship between racial minority women 
and confirmation under a GOP Senate could be driven solely by ideology, and not 
actually by gender and race. If non-white women are more liberal than other nominees, 
on average, this greater ideological distance from the Republican majority, not gender or 
race per se, could be driving any reduced likelihood of confirmation. Ultimately, it has 
been suggested in the past that the confirmation votes of individual Senators are 
predominantly driven by partisanship as well as ideology.34 The dominance of these 
factors and their effect on the confirmation process, discernibly has waned and 
bourgeoned based on the political climate and Senate control. I endeavor to test between 
the two conjectures by first looking for whether there is a evidence of nonwhite women 
being confirmed at a lower rate; and by seeing whether or not this relationship holds even 
after controlling for ideology. 
Crucial to the examination of the third hypothesis is the incorporation of a reliable 
measurement mechanism that places lower federal court judges and Senators in the same 
policy space based on their ideology. The Judicial Common Space (JCS)35 scores are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 L.M. Overly, B.M Henschen, J. Strauss and M. Walsh, “Courting constituents? An 
analysis of the Senate confirmation vote of Justice Clarence Thomas” (1992). 
35 Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal and Chad Westerland. “The Judicial 
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numerical scores within the spectrum of -1 and 1 that refer to the ideology of a given 
lower federal district judge appointed since 1953. The JCS scores have been continuously 
enhanced to make them a more valuable and reliable form of ideological measurement 
(Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Pool 1998; Giles et al. 2001, 2002; Epstein et al. 2007; Boyd 
2015). The Judicial Common Space scores “are the result of a scaling algorithm that 
takes a set of issue scales (a set of measures for Representatives, Senators, and Presidents 
in a two-dimensional Downsian issue space)” 36. Additionally, the measurements rely on 
the concept of Senatorial Courtesy to assign scores within the ideological common space 
range of -1 and 1. 
“If a judge appointed from a state where the President and at least one 
home-state Senator are of the same party, the nominee is assigned the 
NOMINATE Common Space score of the home-state Senator37. If neither 
home-state Senator is of the President’s Party, the nominee receives the 
NOMINATE Common Space score of the appointing President (Giles et 
al. 2001, 2002)”. 
 
Utilizing the Judicial Common Space scores extended by Lee Epstein, Keith Poole’s 
Common Space scores for Congress, and the information of judges available from the 
Federal Judicial Center, Christina Boyd generated the Federal District Court Judge 
Ideology Data38 incorporated into this empirical analysis39.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Common Space.” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 23(2):303-325. 
36 Poole, Keith T. 1998. ‘‘Estimating a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales,’’ 42 
American Journal of Political Science 954–93.  
37 Or the average if both home-state Senators belong to the President’s party.  
38 Christina L. Boyd, 2015. “Federal District Court Judge Ideology Data.”  
39 Unfortunately, the merger of the JCS scores to nominees was not flawless. JCS scores 
were not available for all nominees, therefore reducing the sample size of the second 
logistic regression.  
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Solowiej et al. have superficially explored the relationship between party politics 
and judicial confirmations (Solowiej et al. 2005). While their findings marginally suggest 
that women are most advantaged during the periods in which the GOP controls the Senate 
and the President is of the same party, they rely too heavily on the premise that the 
disjointedness of government (united vs. divided government) and partisanship is an 
appropriate measure of the ideological distance between all key players40. They claim 
that “[their undertaken investigation] provides evidence that partisan differences based on 
electoral cleavages can have legislative consequences beyond the province of economic 
policy”41, but fail to distinguish between party and ideology. They account for the 
partisanship of the nominee, but not necessarily for their ideology. Non-white women are 
likely more liberal on average than white women nominees, even of the same party. If so, 
this could explain any reduced likelihood of confirmation under a GOP Senate, rather 
than gender bias or racial prejudice.  
“In light of the concerns many scholars have raised about the use of party-
based measures to capture judicial ideology, the JCS may provide a more 
precise and valid indicator. The approach of Giles et al. captures the 
ideology of the pool of elites in a particular state from which the President 
selects his judges. For this reason, and those offered by Giles and his 
colleagues, we rely on the approach of Giles et all to place judges in the 
same space.”42 
 
Decisively, the Judicial Common Space scores were determined to be the type of 
measurement best suited to evaluate the role of ideology in judicial confirmations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Lisa Solowiej, Wendy L. Martinek, and Thomas L. Brunell, “Partisan Politics: The 
Impact of Party in the Confirmation of Minority and Female Federal Court Nominees  
41 Ibid.  
42 Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal and Chad Westerland. “The Judicial 
Common Space.” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 23(2):303-325. 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The hypotheses aforementioned were tested empirically by using Wendy 
Martinek’s Lower Federal Court Confirmation Database43, which includes nominations to 
Article III District Court vacancies from 1977 until 2004. Originally the database 
consisted of nominations for vacancies in the lower federal bench within the period of 
1977 – 1998. The inclusion of six additional years’ worth of data allows for an extended 
period of study of nominee characteristics and institutional and political factors. 
Furthermore, Judicial Common Space scores indicative of the Senate and nominees’ 
ideological alignment were merged in as a key additional control to address the third 
hypothesis.  
  In order to test the hypotheses, the observed dependent variable in the analysis 
was the outcome of District Court nominations. To measure that main variable of interest, 
the final congressional action on each nomination was identified and the dependent 
variable took on a value of 0 if the nomination was unsuccessful and a value of 1 if 
successful. Following the precedent set forth by Martinek et al., the nomination was 
coded as being successful if the nominee was approved by the Senate and actually 
confirmed.44 Otherwise, a nomination was deemed unsuccessful if a nominee failed to 
obtain the necessary votes or was withdrawn by the President.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Wendy L. Martinek, The Lower Federal Court Confirmation Database. 1977-2004. 
Constitution Project's Courts Initiative. Binghamton University, 23 Mar. 2005. 
44 Wendy L. Martinek, Mark Kemper, and Steven Van Winkle. "To Advise and Consent: 
The Senate and Lowe Federal Court Nominations.", The Journal of Politics 64.2 (2002): 
337-61. 
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Because the dependent variable is binary, the appropriate technique to analyze the 
relationship between confirmation outcome and other independent variables was via a 
logistic regression45. Given that logit is a nonlinear model, the effects of gender and other 
covariates of interest on the DV depend on the value of the other covariates. As a result, 
to illustrate the substantive size of the effects, I estimate a series of first differences using 
simulations that hold all other independent variables constant at their median values.  
When estimating this model to examine the effects of gender and race, a series of 
independent variables and interactions suggested by the hypotheses were included as well 
as control variables validated by previous literature. Variables of interest regarding the 
characteristics of nominees include their gender, race, qualifications, and frequency with 
which they have been considered to fill positions to District Court vacancies. Female 
refers to the gender of the nominee, where 0 indicates the nominee is male and 1 
indicates the nominee is a female. Non-White refers to the race of the nominee, where 0 
indicates the nominee is White and 1 indicates the nominee is African American, 
Hispanic, Native American, or Asian American. Additionally, an interaction term was 
included to reflect the instances when the same nominee was both a racial minority and a 
female, non-white female. ABA Ratings refers to American Bar Association ratings46 
ranging from 1 to 6, where 1 indicates not qualified and 6 indicated well qualified or 
better. Renomination refers to whether or not it is a renomination of a previous nominee 
for the same seat, where 0 indicates no and 1 indicates yes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Philip H. Pollock III, “A Stata Companion to Political Analysis”, 2015. 	  
46 From Martinek et al. (2002), the ABA rating variable breaks down as follows: 1= not 
qualified, 2 = not qualified/qualified, 3= qualified, 4= qualified/well qualified, 5= well 
qualified/qualified, 6= well qualified or better. 
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Table 4: Summary of Hypotheses & Variables 
Hypothesis Variable Hypothesized Effect 
on Likelihood of 
Confirmation 
H1 Female Nominee - 
H2 Non-White Female 
Nominee 
- 
 Racial Minority 
Nominee 
- 
H3 GOP Controlled 
Senate x Female 
Nominee 
 
GOP Controlled 
Senate x Non-White 
Female Nominee 
 
- 
 
 
-  
 ABA Score + 
 Renomination of a 
Previous Nominee 
for the Same Seat 
 
 
+ 
 Presidential Year - 
 Presidential Term + 
 Presidential 
Approval 
+ 
Note: The hypotheses aforementioned as well as the predicted effect of the independent 
variables on the likelihood of a successful confirmation outcome are summarized in 
Table 4. 
 
Variables typically classified as being institutional and political factors were also 
incorporated into the model. Presidential year refers to the year of presidential term when 
the nomination was made.47 President’s first term refers to whether or not the nomination 
was made during a president’s first term, where 0 indicates no and 1 indicates yes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Nomination made in the first year of presidential term = 1, nomination made in the 
second year of presidential term = 2, nomination made in the third year of presidential 
term = 3, nomination made in the fourth year of presidential term = 4.  
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Presidential approval was an unaltered variable from Martinek et al. (2002), which refers 
to the percentage of survey respondents approving of the president’s job based on the 
Gallup poll closest to the date of nomination. To understand the results by party and 
examine differences depending on which party was in control of the Senate during a 
nominee’s confirmation date, GOP Senate was created where 0 indicates Republicans 
controlled the Senate and 1 indicates Democrats controlled the Senate. To allow for the 
possibility that ideology has different effects for nominees’ confirmation outcomes, 
District Court nominees’ ideology scores (JCS)48 were incorporated via the variable 
ideology.  
RESULTS 
 As previously noted, a logistic regression model was used to econometrically 
examine the relationship between confirmation outcome and a series of independent 
variables relating to three hypotheses. Tables 5 – 6 present these findings. Table 5 
examines the factors influencing likelihood of confirmation by partisan control of the 
Senate, while Table 6 considers factors influencing confirmation outcome and controlling 
for nominee ideology.   
 With regard to the parameter estimates presented in the first column of Table 5, 
many of the main explanatory variables as well as the control variables do not have the 
predicted sign and are not statistically significant. Considering all 1,305 District Court 
nominations within the 1977 – 2004 period without noting which political party was in 
control of the Senate does not yield support for any of the main hypothesized effects on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal and Chad Westerland. “The Judicial 
Common Space.” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 23(2):303-325. 
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confirmation outcome at a significant level. A nominee’s gender was hypothesized to 
decrease the likelihood of confirmation, yet the parameter estimate is neither a negative 
value nor significant at the p<0.05 level, therefore not supportive of H1. Regarding H2, 
the hypothesis that nominees who were both females and of a racial minority would be 
less likely to be confirmed, we can note that the parameter estimate is of the right sign yet 
is nonetheless statistically insignificant. Noteworthy results from model 1 worth 
addressing are the control variables of ABA rating and the year of presidential term. 
ABA ratings evidently have a positive effect on a nominees’ likelihood to get confirmed 
and the parameter estimate is statistically significant at the highest threshold, p<0.01. 
Similarly, the farther into a presidential term a nomination is made the likelihood of a 
nominee getting confirmed significantly decreases, suggestive of the honeymoon effect49. 
To determine the results of the logistic regressions in relation to H3, we initially turn to 
models 2 and 3 of Table 5, which breakdown results by partisan control of the Senate.  
 When comparing the results of models 2 and 3, we can identify very insightful 
findings by focusing on the sign differences of the parameter estimates. Aiming attention 
at a nominee’s gender, a nominee’s race, and the interaction of gender and race, we see 
that these independent variables have the opposite effect on likelihood of confirmation 
based on which party is in control of the Senate at a given time. Under a Republican 
controlled Senate, the coefficient for gender is negative and therefore implies that women 
are less likely to be confirmed than male nominees in the same scenario. Conversely, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Honeymoon effect is the premise that presidents are less likely to obtain a successful 
confirmation for their nominee the farther along in their term they make the nomination 
(Martinek 2002).   
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coefficient for gender under a Democratic Senate is actually positive. In spite of these 
distinct revelations, neither coefficient is statistically significant.  
Table 5: Factors Influencing Likelihood of Confirmation by Partisan Control of 
Senate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All GOP Senate Dem Senate 
    
Female 0.137 -0.204 0.549 
 (0.232) (0.329) (0.337) 
Non-white female -0.660 -0.598 0.444 
 (0.469) (0.620) (1.130) 
Racial minority 0.305 -0.172 0.845** 
 (0.252) (0.370) (0.362) 
ABA rating 0.207*** 0.274*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0515) (0.0793) (0.0697) 
Renomination -0.168 -0.456 0.607 
 (0.296) (0.357) (0.631) 
Year of presidential term -0.363*** -0.680*** -0.111 
 (0.0831) (0.133) (0.127) 
President's first term 0.253 0.761** -0.245 
 (0.176) (0.312) (0.350) 
Presidential approval -0.00209 -0.00469 0.00893 
 (0.00689) (0.0206) (0.00790) 
Constant 1.660*** 2.368* 0.738 
 (0.562) (1.306) (0.824) 
    
Observations 1,305 597 708 
 
Note: Models are logistic regressions.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Furthermore, the flip-flop of direction in the effect on likelihood of confirmation 
also occurred for racial minority female nominees and racial minorities in general. When 
Democrats controlled the Senate, results suggest that racial minorities were more likely to 
be confirmed to the District Court that were whites, all else being equal. The relevant 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant, p<0.05. By contrast, under a 
	  	  
30 
Republican Senate the coefficient for the racial minority variable is negative, though not 
statistically significant. It is of particular importance to note that this statistically 
significant finding was only reveled when the results were segmented by partisan control 
of the Senate. Analyzing results in this manner and comparing changes side by side is an 
analytical technique that has not been employed in prior work and which might explain 
the dismissal of gender and race as contributing to confirmation differences.   
The interaction between gender and race has particularly been lacking from 
previous literature that claims gender and race have no marked effect on confirmation 
outcome (Solowiej et al. 2005; Asmussen 2011). Despite the fact that the relationship 
between the hypothesized independent variables and the dependent variable are not all 
statistically significant, the inclusion of them further reinforces the effect of the 
informative variables. From Table 5, we can garner that the interaction of gender and race 
has a distinct effect on likelihood of confirmation depending on which party is in control. 
While the coefficient for the interaction is positive in the Democratic control model 
(model 3), the same coefficient is negative under Republican control of the Senate. Yet 
neither, on their own, is significant.  
The analysis of the data is not supportive of an extensive gender gap and does not 
support the claim that gender alone is an imperative factor inhibiting women from 
obtaining a successful confirmation to District Court judgeships. However, the empirical 
results are supportive of the hypothesis that racial minority females are less likely to be 
confirmed by a GOP controlled Senate than their white female and male counterparts. 
Working with predicted probabilities and evaluating the data from Table 5 model 2, 
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factors influencing likelihood of confirmation by GOP control of Senate, we can more 
specifically discern to what degree racial minority female nominees are disadvantaged. 
Consulting Figure 1 serves to visually highlight the substantive size of the effects of 
being a woman, a racial minority, and the merger of both on the probability of 
confirmation. 
Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Confirmation During GOP Controlled Senate 
 
Note: Points represent point estimate for each nominee; segment represents confidence 
interval; dotted line represents predicted probability for median white male nominee.  
  
Serving as the status quo and therefore reference point in this analysis, a white 
male nominee nominated to a District Court judgeship during a GOP controlled Senate 
has a predicted probability of being confirmed of 0.90, represented by the dotted line. 
The predicted probability of female nominees is 0.87 with a 95% confidence interval of 
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[0.78, 0.93], which encompasses the predicted probability of the control. Fairly the same 
can be said for minority nominees, which have a predicted probability of confirmation of 
0.88 and a 95% confidence interval of [0.79,0.94]. Significantly lower, however, is the 
predicted probability of confirmation for racial minority a nominee, which is 0.76 with a 
95% confidence interval of [0.59,0.89].  
Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Confirmation During Democrat Controlled 
Senate 
 
Note: Points represent point estimate for each nominee; segment represents confidence 
interval; dotted line represents predicted probability for median white male nominee.  
 
On the other hand, examination of the data via Figure 2 illustrates how 
dramatically different the effects are under a Democrat controlled Senate. Not only does 
Figure 2 clearly highlight the differences in sign of the coefficients between a GOP and 
Democrat controlled Senate obtained in Table 5, but also it visually showcases the 
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particularly positive effects of being a female or racial minority nominee under a 
Democrat controlled Senate. Figure 2 suggests that the positive effect of being a minority 
is statistically different from zero, and confirms that a minority nominee would be more 
likely to obtain a successful confirmation during a Democrat controlled Senate when 
compared to the median white male nominee.  
Controlling for Ideology  
 This paper’s analysis began by evaluating the interaction of race and gender to 
determine whether racial minority female nominees face lower prospects of confirmation.  
Results further alluded to the fact that political preferences and ideological alignment are 
capable of having a marked effect on confirmation outcome. Scholars have previously 
insinuated that Republicans have no incentives to purposely oppose the confirmation of 
female and minority nominees because they face political costs in doing so (Asmussen 
2011). However, prior literature has not incorporated a measure for individual nominee 
ideology to control for ideology in a logistic regression model. While, Solowiej et al 
disaggregated their results by partisan control, they did not consider the fundamental 
interaction of gender and race via racial minority female nominees. Having found the 
effect that nonwhite women are less likely to be confirmed by a GOP Senate than white 
males depicted in Table 5, I proceeded to examine whether this effect was driven by 
ideology instead of gender and race. In order to examine whether women, and 
particularly women of color, are less likely to be confirmed by a Republican Senate 
because nominees with these gender and racial characteristics tend to be more liberal than 
other nominees, we relied on JCS scores to control for the ideology of the individual 
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nominees. With this additional measure, concerns about omitted variable bias are being 
addressed to eliminate the possibility that we are attributing an effect to gender and race 
that is actually being caused by ideology. Consequently, Table 6 incorporated ideological 
scores and controlled for nominee ideology.  
In the first model of Table 6, we once again consider all District Court 
nominations within the 1977-2004 period without noting which political party was in 
control of the Senate. Different from the first model conducted in Table 5, Judicial 
Common Space scores for nominees were incorporated into the logistic regression.  This 
inclusion and analysis is a robustness check on whether women, minority, and racial 
minority nominees are still disadvantaged by a GOP controlled Senate when accounting 
for the possibility that they may be more liberal. It is crucial to note, however, that 
including the additional control comes at a cost being that a generous number of 
observations are lost. About half of the observations of rejected nominees are lost when 
we control for ideology, most likely due to the fact that the nominees have to eventually 
get confirmed to the District Courts to get a JCS score assigned to them.  
Proceeding to models 2 and 3 of Table 6, the ideology of nominees is only 
statistically significant when Democrats control the Senate but not during GOP periods of 
control. Following the pattern observed in Table 5, the coefficients for gender and race 
shift from being negative during Republican control of the Senate to positive under 
Democratic control. Peculiarly, the race coefficient in model three is substantively 
smaller than its counterpart in Table 5 when controlling for ideology. This minor detail is 
an indication that further examination and analysis might determine that controlling for 
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ideology reduces the variability of outcome between GOP and Democratic controlled 
Senates.   
Table 6: Factors Influencing Confirmation Controlling for Nominee Ideology 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All GOP Senate Dem Senate 
    
Female -0.126 -0.413 0.474 
 (0.297) (0.420) (0.459) 
Non-white female -0.209 0.0807 0.334 
 (0.603) (0.779) (1.228) 
Racial minority -0.157 -0.600 0.0502 
 (0.306) (0.438) (0.456) 
ABA rating 0.100 0.141 0.106 
 (0.0654) (0.0982) (0.0937) 
Renomination 0.639 0.214 2.921*** 
 (0.482) (0.565) (1.069) 
Year of presidential term -0.114 -0.670*** 0.701*** 
 (0.106) (0.188) (0.174) 
President's first term -0.387 -0.0727 -1.598*** 
 (0.257) (0.472) (0.589) 
Presidential approval 0.00379 -0.0258 0.0661*** 
 (0.00895) (0.0253) (0.0136) 
Nominee ideology -1.234*** -0.313 -3.998*** 
 (0.337) (0.541) (0.592) 
Constant 2.365*** 5.184*** -1.597 
 (0.698) (1.604) (1.145) 
    
Observations 1,207 555 652 
 
Note: Models are logistic regressions.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Figure 3, predicted probability of confirmation during GOP controlled Senate 
controlling for ideology, allows us to examine whether the effect of being a woman, a 
minority, or both, is statistically significantly different from zero when controlling for 
nominee ideology. Because nonwhite female is an interaction variable, we must once 
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again look beyond the p-value of the coefficient to see if the net effect is different from 
zero. 
Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Confirmation During GOP Controlled Senate & 
Controlling for Ideology 
 
Note: Points represent point estimate for each nominee; segment represents confidence 
interval; dotted line represents predicted probability for median white male nominee. 
  
Whereas Figure 2 clearly illustrated that racial minority female nominees were less likely 
to be confirmed under a GOP controlled Senate, when we control for nominee ideology 
we do not see the same results as clearly depicted in Figure 3. The 95% confidence 
interval of racial minority females includes the predicted probability for a white male 
nominee of 0.91, so we cannot say with 95% confidence that the effect of being both a 
woman and a minority is statistically different from zero. Yet, it is of utmost importance 
to note that the 95% confidence interval [0.54, 0.92] of the predicted probability for racial 
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minority females just barely includes the 0.91 predicted probability for a white male. 
Thus, we would be able to say with 90% confidence that controlling for nominee 
ideology, the effect of being a racial minority female on likelihood of confirmation is in 
fact significantly different from zero.  
A clear variance is that ABA ratings and year of presidential term were no longer 
statistically significant. Instead, we can observe that the negative effect on confirmation 
outcome of nominees’ ideologies is the only variable statistically significant at the p<0.01 
level. The change in results with regard to the control variables in models 2 and 3 were 
not largely expected. Whereas renomination of a nominee, presidential first term, and 
presidential approval failed to have a significant effect on confirmation outcome for any 
of the aforementioned models, they suddenly are very significant when controlling for 
nominee ideology and only when focusing on a Democratic controlled Senate. Grounded 
in the literature50 was the supposition that if both parties were responsible for obstruction 
in attempts of upholding ideology then it shouldn’t make a difference whether Democrats 
or Republicans controlled the Senate. As indicated by the results, however, controlling 
for ideology does not eliminate differences in confirmation success and instead this 
independent variable magnifies the importance of institutional factors during Democratic 
control.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Sheldon Goldman, “Assessing the Senate judicial conformation process: The Index of 
Obstruction and Delay,” Judicature Vol. 86, No. 5 (March-April 2003), 251-257. 
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DISCUSSION 
 Before concluding, it is worthwhile to consider the results of this empirical 
analysis and the several implications regarding the appointment of nominees to District 
Court judgeships and the lower federal bench as a whole. As this examination has aimed 
to demonstrate, the nominees that survive the confirmation process and occupy the lower 
federal bench play a large role in shaping the judiciary and are an expression of the 
diversity the Senate is willing to accept. Prior literature and an array of empirical 
techniques have generated contradictory results regarding what leads certain nominees to 
be more successful than others in getting confirmed by the Senate.  
 Previous results have hinted at the fact that gender does not significantly affect 
confirmation outcome (Martinek 2002; Solowiej et al 2005; Asmussen 2011) while 
conflicting results has proven it can play a major role (Hartley 2001; Nixon and Goss 
2001). Similarly, race is a factor that has been determined as being significant (Martinek 
2002) at times but insignificant at others (Hartley 2001; Asmussen 2011). Lastly, the 
effects of divided government have been characterized as catastrophic for the likelihood 
of confirmation of certain nominees (Bell 2002; Binder and Maltzman 2002) yet seen as 
not a problem by other scholars (Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998).  
This study set out to replicate and enhance previous empirical models in order to 
understand predictors of confirmation outcome and address the disparity of results. While 
scholars have predominantly steered away from investigating confirmation outcome for 
fear that it is not as productive and insightful as analyzing confirmation duration, it is 
clear that there is still a lot to discover regarding the factors that influence likelihood of 
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confirmation. By accounting for partisan control of the Senate and incorporating 
interactions between a series of independent variables, a combination of novel results 
were obtained. Gender and minority status of a nominee separately do not appear to pose 
a significant threat to confirmation success, as determined by a series of difference of 
means tests and logistic regressions. However, when these two individual characteristics 
interact, as is the case with Loretta Lynch and many other nominees facing confirmation 
by a GOP controlled Senate, the Senate confirmation process for nominees is no longer a 
level playing field. The findings in this study dispel previous assertions that “Senators are 
rather disinclined to oppose female and minority nominations because they face political 
costs for doing so”51 and in fact empirically showcases that GOP Senators are more 
reluctant to confirm racial minority female nominees.  
Given the heightened levels of diversity among the citizens of the United States, it 
comes as a surprise that scholars have not dedicated ample time to investigating the 
complexity that exists when gender, race, and political ideology collide. The lack of 
analysis of this interaction partially explains why it has rarely been empirically proven 
that a difference in confirmation outcome exists for racial minority women. Results have 
been dismissed as insignificant because no gender gap or racial gap in confirmation 
outcome has been empirically confirmed in contemporary literature. However, as we now 
know, the race factor and its synergy with gender has been missing, and this analysis is 
an appeal for different cleavages in existing literature to be individually explored.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Nicole Asmussen, “Female and Minority Judicial Nominees: President’s Delight and 
Senators’ Dismay?” (2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
 Inspired by the diverging empirical evidence regarding the influence of the gender 
and race of nominees on their confirmation outcomes, this analysis demonstrated the 
benefits of incorporating multiple nominee characteristics while controlling for ideology 
and partisanship. Reflective of contemporary times and of the regularity with which the 
same nominee has more than one nonconventional attribute, this investigation has shown 
that the interlace of multiple individual characteristics merit further exploration.  
 As diversity in America continues to spring forward in all senses including gender 
identification, race, class and sexuality, it will be fascinating to explore if and how 
quickly the judiciary adapts to changes. The other branches of the federal government 
have forcefully embraced change; yet the judiciary is subjected to the Senate’s potential 
unwillingness to embrace the implications of confirming controversial non-traditional 
nominees, such as a judge who happens to be transgender or disabled. Evidently, there 
are numerous directions for future research offered in this examination. It is pivotal that 
forthcoming scholarship address and further examine the interaction of individual 
attributes, preferences, and behaviors and their effect on confirmation outcome.  
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